Terror threat has morphed into a large, powerful monster, says Shanmugam

SINGAPORE — The threat of a terrorist attack in Singapore is at its highest level in recent times, in light of the Islamic State's (ISIS) global expansion, including into South-east Asia, said Minister for Home Affairs and Law K Shanmugam, who noted that the recent terror attacks in Paris and Jakarta have shown a different, more dangerous modus operandi. Speaking at the Home Team Leaders' Forum yesterday, he added that the Government will enhance its counter-terrorism strategy in three areas to keep Singapore safe and secure.

These include enhancing protective security measures for critical infrastructure and soft targets; forming new Emergency Response Teams to respond quickly to terror attacks and launching a new national programme called SG Secure to sensitise, organise, train and exercise Singaporeans to better protect ourselves from a terrorist attack. Below is an excerpt from his speech.

Over several years, the terror threat has been growing and we have taken that threat very seriously. We have enacted tough laws, enforced strict gun controls, upgraded border security and strengthened our Home Team Departments and other security agencies to prevent, detect and respond to these attacks. And we work closely with foreign security partners. But security responses alone are not enough. We work in close partnership with religious and community groups within Singapore to counter extremist ideology at the source, inoculate our community from radical extremism, and try to preserve our common space and our way of life. These efforts have served us well so far.

But in 2015, we saw the terror threat morph into a large, powerful monster. It is now a qualitatively different and much more dangerous threat. ISIS presents a far graver threat than Al Qaeda or its affiliated entities ever were.

In 2015, there were at least 56 attacks that were directed or inspired by ISIS, outside Iraq and Syria. Many of these attacks targeted civilians — quite worrying. ISIS controls large territories and oil resources.

It is extremely skilful in the use of social media and has recruited more than 30,000 foreign fighters from all around the world, including this region and including Singapore.

It has used religion as an effective tool. It builds up hatred, anger against perceived injustices, makes people believe that God wants them to kill. It has expanded globally by establishing "wilayats" — provinces. It now has a presence, along those lines, in at least nine countries. In scale, network, finances, propaganda, ISIS is at a different level and sophistication, compared with other terrorist groups.

THE THREAT TO SINGAPORE

The threat of a terrorist attack here is at its highest level in recent times, much more so than after 9/11 and the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members. Why do I say this? We have to assess the threat by considering: i) What ISIS wants to do; ii) What is happening in the region and iii) What is happening within Singapore.

ISIS wants to establish a caliphate in the region, encompassing Singapore. We are in the epicentre of the caliphate ISIS wants to establish.

In my speech on Jan 19 at the SRP Distinguished Lecture & Symposium, I set out fairly extensively, the political backdrop in the region and how that is leading us to increasing extremism.

We have to keep that political backdrop because when politics fails, then everything else fails, and that is unfortunately happening. But, as you keep that political background in mind, we can then see how the terror threat in the region is growing. I will sketch out the situation in a few countries and some groups, which are non-country specific.

First, we will look at Malaysia. In 2015, there were more than 100 arrests of persons suspected to have ISIS links. Malaysia's Special Branch has said seven terrorist plots were foiled in 2015 alone. One of them was at an advanced stage of planning. There was even a plot to kidnap the Prime Minister. In January, Malaysia detained a potential suicide bomber just hours before his planned suicide attack in Kuala Lumpur. There is also a substantial threat posed by "clean skins", people with no criminal records and not under the scrutiny of security agencies. They come together through social media. In April last year, Malaysia arrested 12 militants, all clean skins. If they wanted to travel, they could get past many immigration counters undetected.

Every day we have more than 400,000 persons crossing, both ways, at our land checkpoints in Woodlands and Tuas. So you work out for yourself the nature of the threat to us from a would-be terrorist in Malaysia.

In Indonesia, in 2015, there were at least 74 terror-related arrests. Nine plots had been foiled in 2015 and there was the Jakarta attack in January. Some of the pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia are coming together under the banner of Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK).

There are other groups outside JAK that are now competing for attention, significantly increasing the possibility of one-upmanship attacks.

The JI network in Indonesia also seems to be reviving. In December 2015, Indonesia announced that it had detained four JI-linked operatives. They had guns, bomb-making material, "jihad" material. The situation is made worse by a number of factors. Indonesian security forces are hampered by the lack of adequate security legislation. The Indonesians have said that they will strengthen the legislation, but this will take time.

And until that is done, there is a big lacuna. What does that mean? It is not a crime in Indonesia if you wanted to join ISIS. It is not a crime if you have violent tendencies.

The four Indonesians (planning to travel to Syria) that the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) had picked up last month ... we handed them over to the Indonesians and the Indonesians then released them because they cannot hold them.

By the end of this year, 150 persons in Indonesian prisons for terror-related offences will be released.

They are not yet de-radicalised. They cannot be held, like how we can hold people under the Internal Security Act. So we have three streams of supply of terrorists.

One, homegrown terrorists whom, until they actively do something, cannot be arrested. You have a second group, the prisoners who are going to be released; and there is a third group, the people who are going to return from Syria and Iraq, and cannot be arrested under Indonesian laws. These three groups are all coalescing in Indonesia.

If we look at the returnees from Syria and Iraq, there are an estimate of about 1,000, from South-east Asia, mainly from Indonesia and Malaysia, who have gone to fight for ISIS. They are battle hardened with combat skills, violent tendencies and extremist ideology. They are willing to die. When they come back, obviously they will pose a significant risk.

We should also look briefly at the rest of the region. In Thailand, there was the Erawan Shrine bombing in August 2015. In the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf Group continues to be active. Throughout 2015 — there have been terrorist incidents in the Philippines.

Some Philippines and Malaysian militants based in south Philippines are said to have pledged allegiance to ISIS and ISIS is said to have accepted the pledge. That could make the situation worse because a wilayat could be established in south Philippines.

Extremist Uighur militants also pose a significant threat in South-east Asia. They are believed to have linked up with militant networks in South-east Asia. They were involved in the Erawan attack. Groups sympathetic to the perceived mistreatment of Uighurs could target Chinese interests in South-east Asia.

Then there is the Rohingya issue, which also has potential security implications. There are as many as 100,000 Rohingya refugees in Malaysia; and 120,000 Rohingya refugees in Thailand, in camps.

They are vulnerable to radicalisation. ISIS has now specifically targeted them. Retaliatory attacks on Myanmarese interests have already been attempted. Buddhists could be an obvious target.

As can be seen — we do not have a pretty picture. There are multiple layers of threats in this region: Complex; interwoven; fusing religion with domestic political grievances and ranging from Myanmar to Indonesia. And we sit in the middle, an oasis of calm and a prime target for all.

Let me now turn to specific threats to Singapore. There are at least four possible types of threats. First, attacks that can be planned just outside and then they come in and carry out the attacks here. That is what happened in Paris. The attacks were planned in Molenbeek, in Belgium. We have several possible Molenbeeks around us. 200 million people pass through both ways, our checkpoints, including air and sea checkpoints.

The second threat is the attacks involving weapons that could be smuggled across from just outside for use by Singaporeans. This is why the checks at our checkpoints have to be very, very stringent. You cannot trade security for convenience. The third threat is that of a lone-wolf attack by self-radicalised individuals, which perhaps because security at our checkpoints is quite tight, lone-wolf attacks become a higher possibility. The fourth threat is foreign workers in Singapore who can get radicalised.

These threats are real.

I will now say a little more about the threats from self-radicalisation. There has been a noticeable rise in lone-wolf attacks worldwide. The call for lone-wolf attacks came from ISIS spokesman Adnani, who gave a message in September 2014. He asked followers to carry out attacks in any manner or way, however it may be. Six attacks took place in 2014 after Adnani's statement. Eleven more attacks took place in 2015. The nature of attacks has become "simpler".

People have begun to use knifes, machetes — items that are easily accessible to people. This is a nightmare for every security agency, including the Home Team. This is the landscape. It is no longer a question of whether an attack will take place, but really, when is an attack going to take place in Singapore, and we have to be prepared for that.

The critical task for the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in the coming years is to deal with this. I will now turn to the Security response and the Community response that are needed.

SECURITY RESPONSE

The attacks in Paris on Nov 13 and in Jakarta on Jan 14 have shown a different, more dangerous Modus Operandi. These were multi-shooter attacks staged almost simultaneously over different locations. Second, the targets were places where crowds congregate, with little or no security protection like restaurants, a sports stadium, concert venue, shopping malls. Third, in Paris, the attackers took hostages not to negotiate, but to inflict maximum casualties.

The intent of such attacks is to achieve high, maximum public visibility, inflict maximum damage and create a climate of fear. Beyond the loss of lives, the attackers wanted to destroy the psychological resilience and social fabric of local communities. We have in place a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which has dealt with the challenges so far and quite effectively. Now we have to deal with an increased set of threats and deal with a new modus operandi. We have to do this urgently. We have to and will significantly enhance measures in two areas: Security protection and vigilance, and security response.

First, we will further enhance protective security measures for buildings and premises. These include critical infrastructure like Changi Airport and government buildings, and also soft targets like entertainment centres, sports facilities and shopping centres.

Security vigilance will be substantially enhanced through a significant expansion of CCTV coverage. The enhanced CCTV coverage will give us three significant advantages in our fight against terrorism: (i) Greater deterrence via police cameras at HDB blocks and other places; (ii) it will give the police better sense-making and (iii) situational awareness. This is critical.

The Home Team will develop deep data-analytical capabilities to allow real-time monitoring and analysis of the CCTV data. This will allow us to plan and execute our responses much more incisively. CCTV footage will also help us identify the perpetrators, shorten the time taken to apprehend them and prevent them from launching more attacks. We will complete the installation of police cameras at 10,000 HDB resident blocks and multi-storey car parks this year.

We will then move on to cover common areas in the heartlands, especially areas with high human traffic, such as town centres, hawker centres and walkways linking up to major transportation nodes. Phased installation of cameras will start later this year.

It will be completed progressively over the next four years.

Beyond police cameras, there are other data that we can make better use of to fight terror. This includes existing CCTVs islandwide. We will set up the network infrastructure to allow CCTV data in more areas to be accessible to the police on-demand. These include CCTVs monitoring the public transportation system, commercial buildings with high footfall, and Government buildings. The police will work closely with premises owners to allow police access to their CCTVs. Members of the public will also be able to submit videos to the police on crowdsourcing platforms. This is a necessary, strategic and direct response to the evolving and dangerous mode of terrorist attacks.

Second, we will, where necessary, enact legislation, rules to require premises owners and organisers of major events to put in place necessary security measures. For example, MHA will engage developers of large-scale building projects, which are likely to have high volume of human traffic, to factor in new security considerations at the design stage. Premises owners could be asked to put in place CCTV systems that meet baseline technical standards. At major events, organisers will also be asked to screen persons before they enter the venue. During periods of heightened security alert, these measures will be enhanced. There are good reasons for requiring such measures. Terrorist attacks in major cities have been staged at soft targets because these places have little or no security protection. We need to do more, the Government has to partner with the private and people sectors, to better protect these soft targets.

We must assume that even with all these measures, some attacks will get through, so we will also enhance our ability to respond to these attacks. When an attack takes place, the speed and the manner in which we respond will be critical in taking down the attackers and limiting the damage.

The Home Team has studied the recent attacks. We will upgrade our capabilities, modify our operational set-up to deal with these challenges.

It is critical for our security forces to arrive quickly — the current norms have to change and they must have the capacity to take down the attackers, which means enhancing the numbers.

We will reorganise the police response forces to a terrorist incident, enhance their firepower and operational capability, and deploy them in a way so that they can arrive faster at any location in Singapore. This is going to be absolutely critical to deal with the mode of terrorist attacks where the aim of the attackers is to kill as many people as they can and inflict maximum damage and fear.

We will form new Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) to respond quickly, engage the attackers and minimise the casualties. They will be specially trained with counter-assault skills and equipped with the necessary weapons. Day to day, they will patrol the terrain and engage stakeholders to build familiarity with the areas they will be in charge of. The aim is to significantly upgrade our immediate response capability.

We will also enhance the response of the second wave of forces. These are the specialist teams from the Special Operations Command and the Gurkha Contingent. They will be enabled to arrive at the scene faster. On top of this, the Home Team will also work more closely with the SAF to deal with the threat, where necessary.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE

Next, let me talk about community response. Our ability to deal with terrorism effectively as a country depends on how many Singaporeans face up to, and respond, to this challenge as individuals and as members of the community.

I mentioned earlier that the aim of the attackers is to inflict maximum fear and casualties and divide society. This is why the cornerstone of a counter-terrorism strategy has to be a community response plan — one that enhances community vigilance, community cohesion and community resilience.

With these considerations in mind, the Home Team will develop and launch a new national programme, which we will call SG Secure.

SG Secure will represent our national strategy to safeguard our homeland and our way of life against this threat. Just as we have Total Defence, which involves every Singaporean playing a part for the defence of Singapore, SG Secure must become a rallying call for Singaporeans from all walks of life to unite, to play a part in making Singapore a safe place that it is today. It has to be a new national movement to sensitise, organise, train and exercise Singaporeans, so that we can better protect ourselves from attacks. SG Secure cannot just another public awareness campaign. It has to be a call to action.

We have to execute this in a systematic, structured and sustained manner and I do not underestimate the difficulties. Training up our own forces, increasing the numbers that we have, increasing the number of ERTs, getting building premises owners to put in measures; all these we can do through legislation, through effort. But getting the community together in this new movement is a different ball game and it is not going to be easy. But we have to try and we have to do it. It can only be achieved if we can get everyone to participate. It will take time and resources from all in society. But it has to be done to keep Singapore safe and secure.

The Home Team will roll out SG Secure, together with our partners, later this year. We will urge all Singaporeans to come on board and take an active role in this programme: (i) To understand the security landscape and the threats that we face; (ii) to be equipped with the right skills; and (iii) to help spread the messages of vigilance, cohesion and resilience to friends, families and colleagues.

So if an attack occurs, we need to be able to recover well. The day after is even more important. We have to emerge stronger, more united and more determined as Singaporeans.

The terrorism threat to us is real. We will take all precautions to prevent a terrorist attack from taking place in Singapore. We hope we never have an attack but if an attack occurs, we have to prepare Singaporeans with psychological and other skills, to come together and emerge stronger.

A Singapore that is even more united and determined to safeguard our way of life, our racial and religious harmony. A Singapore, where every Singaporean knows that he or she can rely on fellow countrymen. This is how we must be able to respond to terrorism.

The fight ultimately is one between freedom and terror; a fight between liberty and servitude; a fight between the spirit of humanity and the forces of darkness; or very simply, a fight between good and evil. I do not believe that the terrorists will ever win in the longer term. We must believe that we can never be kept down by terror. Liberty, freedom and the human spirit will ultimately succeed. But we have to be prepared to fight for it.

Source: Terror threat has morphed into a large, powerful monster, says Shanmugam