PM Lee, President Widodo to meet for leaders' retreat in mid-2016

JAKARTA: Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Indonesian President Joko Widodo are expected to meet for a leaders' retreat in the middle of this year in Indonesia, said Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

This will be the second stand-alone bilateral meeting for both leaders and it marks 50 years of relations between the two countries. They first met during Mr Widodo's introductory visit last year.

Dr Balakrishnan said the exact date and venue of the leaders' retreat has not been confirmed. He also stressed that the relationship between Singapore and Indonesia is good and that there are many opportunities to enhance it.

BEST NOT TO ALLOW DIFFERENCES TO SLOW US DOWN: BALAKRISHNAN

Speaking to reporters from Singapore at the end of his two-day visit to Jakarta on Wednesday (Jan 13), Dr Balakrishnan said like all close-standing relationships, there may be problems from time to time. 

"There will always be issues, we will always do our best to resolve those that can, sometimes they may take a bit longer, but ... the more important point (is that) we will try our best not to allow differences to slow us down, to impede the momentum for progress, because we actually have a very full agenda, many things to do together," he said.

This was Dr Balakrishnan's introductory visit to Indonesia as Singapore's Foreign Minister. During his visit to the capital, Dr Balakrishnan met with President Widodo, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Luhut Pandjaitan, his counterpart Retno Marsudi, and Communications and Information Minister Rudiantara.

Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan meeting Indonesian President Joko Widodo. (Photo: AFP/Adek Berry)

Dr Balakrishnan said he had a good visit and had extensive discussions on economic partnerships between Singapore and Indonesia. 

He added that Indonesia is contemplating making significant changes in the regulatory framework for Batam, Bintan and Karimun, and that there were also discussions on how to improve the labour relations in the economic zone. The Indonesian government is expected to make announcements on the regulatory review in one to two weeks, he said.

"What our investors or what our private sector have told us is they need certainty," said Dr Balakrishnan. "They need to know what the rules are, they need a sense that there is a level playing field, they are not being disadvantaged, rules are not going to be chopped and changed down the road. When there is certainty, and if it makes business sense, I think investments will flow."

Dr Balakrishnan also spoke with Indonesian leaders on the haze issue. He said the discussions were positive and they assured him no efforts will be spared to improve the situation. Dr Balakrishnan said the Indonesians seemed fairly confident that things should improve.

​COLLABORATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES WORKING

On security, Dr Balakrishnan said the calm situation in the region has shown the effectiveness of governments working closely together.

"We've just had Christmas and the New Year and in fact, agencies in Indonesia, Malaysia and in Singapore were on alert, because usually these holiday seasons are the time when you anticipate such attacks," he said. "It calls for collaboration, for exchange of information, effective enforcement on the ground. Fortunately that appears to be working."

He also spoke about Tuesday's bombing in Istanbul, expressing deep regret and stressing the importance of governments sharing information and working collectively across boundaries.

Source: PM Lee, President Widodo to meet for leaders' retreat in mid-2016

Common Public Good at Sea: Evolving Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region

The following piece by guest author Captain Gurpreet S. Khurana, PhD, was originally posted by The National Maritime Foundation, and was republished with permission.  You can read it in its original form here. 

The concept of 'Common Public Good(s) at Sea' has lately gained much traction in the context of maritime safety and security in the Afro-Asian swath of the Indo-Pacific region.[i] As the centre-of-gravity of world's economic power shifts eastwards, the salience of this predominantly maritime-configured region is increasing, and the attendant emphasis on security and stability in its maritime domain.

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One does not recall coming across a precise definition of the phrase 'Common Public Good(s) at Sea' (CPGS). The closest one gets is to define it is through exemplification of a navy's 'constabulary' and 'benign' tasks at sea, ranging from counter-piracy and counter-terrorism to search and rescue (SAR), and humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief (HADR). This essay attempts to understand CPGS as a concept, examine the regional trends, and extrapolate the emerging CGPS architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Concept

Most of us are familiar to the term 'public good(s)' used in the economic context. It draws its genesis from the renowned economist Paul Samuelson, who defined it in his 1954 paper as:

"[goods] which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that good."[ii]

A 'public good' is, therefore, something that is a collective good sans exclusions. Further, it is not amount to a 'zero-sum' reckoning; in a sense that its consumption by one entity does not reduce its availability to other entities. In the maritime domain, a public good are best represented by 'lighthouses' that beacon weather-beaten seafarers to ports and safe waters.

Much of the world's ocean realm wherein humans undertake multifarious maritime activities is 'international medium' not subject to the laws of any single country. The delivery of safety and security in such space of global commons thus becomes a logical extension of 'public good'. Further, such 'good' could be extrapolated to the littoral. The watery medium provides transnational access to maritime security forces to undertake humanitarian missions during adverse contingencies on and off foreign shores. It is pertinent to note that while undertaking such benign tasks – whether at high seas or in the foreign littoral – the maritime forces perform a valuable function for their respective governments as 'instruments of foreign policy.' Given the above, in the contemporary context, CPGS may be defined as: 'measures taken by the maritime security forces to meet their respective States' international commitments towards facilitating good and lawful order in the maritime global commons, while also meeting their respective foreign policy objectives.'

It is necessary to note, however, that the maritime domain – represented by the seas and oceans of the world – constitutes the most unregulated and treacherous realm on Earth. To develop situational awareness in this domain, deliver safety and regulate activities therein presents a formidable challenge for maritime forces, including those belonging to major naval powers.

The Regional Context

In geographical terms, the Indo-Pacific region has a predominant maritime configuration. While geography has been a 'constant' in history, the so-called 'rise of Asia' and the attendant maritime-economic activity in the region has made the CPGS concept highly relevant to the regional countries and the extra-regional stakeholders. Traditionally – or at least in more recent times since the beginning of the post Cold War era – CPGS across the globe, and particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, has been provided by the maritime forces of the United States (US); at times, assisted by the forces of what the US calls, its "allies and partners."

The regional countries, beset by the lack of adequate capacity – besides limited national objectives in terms of geographical scope – have been largely content with the arrangement, and have adopted a 'free-rider' approach to security. However, clearly, such a measure is not sustainable, neither for the regional countries, not for the global stakeholders. It is not easy – even for a superpower like the US – to deliver CPGS incessantly in the nearly 'endless' stretch of the world's maritime realm. The military/ naval resources of the US have been increasingly stretched since the end of Cold War due to its increasing military-strategic commitments overseas. The geopolitical challenges added to the US resource 'overstretch,' best exemplified by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). This led the US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to propound the concept of 'Thousand-Ship Navy' (TSN) in 2005.

Seeking support of allies and partners to partake the responsibility of CPGS, the TSN concept continued well into later years, though 'TSN' concept was later rephrased as the 'Global Maritime Partnership' (GMP) initiative, and the same was highlighted in the US Maritime Strategy document of 2007.

In the long run, the reliance of the Indo-Pacific region on a single power (or even on a group of 'monolithic' western powers) for providing CPGS may not be in the interest of the regional countries and global stakeholders alike, including the US. There are nascent indicators of a change, which augurs well for both categories of nations.

Emerging CPGS Architecture

Tier One

For the US, since the beginning of the current decade, delivery of CPGS in the Indo-Pacific has assumed greater salience than ever before in consonance with its national-strategic concept of 'Re-balance to Asia.'   Strategy-2015 furthers the appeal for the partnership, with the 'Global Maritime Partnership' (GMP) – of the 2007 Maritime Strategy document – now rephrased as a "global network of navies" in the 2015 Maritime Strategy. The 2015 document effectively communicates to the potential partners the rationale for such "plug and play" cooperation with the US forces sans "commitment."

While the US has been a 'constant' in terms of delivery of CPGS in the region, and it may continue to be the 'lead actor' for some time, it is unlikely to be the 'only' provider of 'net security'[viii] in the longer run. The Indo-Pacific is witness to the emergence of new major and middle powers with increasing geopolitical, economic and military stakes in the entire Indo-Pacific region. For geopolitical and military-strategic reasons, China is likely to contest the primacy of the US in delivery of CPGS. Notably, however, the Chinese refer to CPGS differently, as 'Military Operations Other than War' (MOOTW), as indicated in China's Defence White Papers since the 2012 document titled 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces.'

Tier Two

While the US-China dialectic may soon emerge as the first tier of the regional CPGS arrangement, other medium powers are likely supplement it and form the second tier. These include Australia, India and Japan: middle powers, all of whom have gained considerably from their alliance/ partnership with the US, but would like to form a concert to hedge against being entangled in the US-China tussle. Towards this end, analysts are increasingly promoting the idea of "middle power coalitions" to offset big-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia's strategic focus has traditionally been on its eastern seaboard facing the Pacific. Lately, however, Canberra is increasingly looking westwards, akin to a "pivot to the Indian Ocean," and reminiscent of events of the 1970s leading to Australia's

Counter Piracy Operations

'Two-Ocean Navy' policy enunciated in 1986.[xii] Sam Bateman writes, "Australia's approach to the Indian Ocean in recent decades might appear to have waxed and waned (but) it never withered away…I don't see any prospect of the current 'pivot' withering away!"[xiii]

The second tier is likely to be reinforced by the European Union (EU). Through the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta, the EU has already proved itself to be a reckonable actor in the Indian Ocean, and the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) promulgated in June 2014 is likely synergise the role of EU navies to provide CPGS – and least in the IOR, if not further eastwards – through its "integrated approach to global maritime security." The Strategy would support the role of France – the only major power besides the US that has maintained a continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean – and would draw support from the re-establishment of the Royal Navy's permanent presence east of the Suez after a hiatus of nearly 45 years.

 Tier Three

In due course, some other medium powers and other relevant countries are likely to share the stage by taking on the gauntlet of CPGS in the Indo-Pacific, forming the third tier of the regional CPGS architecture. The potential medium powers include Indonesia and Iran. Indonesia has enunciated for itself the sobriquet of "Porus Maritim Dunia" (global maritime axis) that envisions developing of the maritime power of the archipelagic nation to its full potential. Further, in consonance with its geo-strategic centrality, it seeks to shape events in the maritime space of the Indo-Pacific region. Although Jakarta has accorded priority to internal consolidation, it is likely to play a significant CPGS role in the region.

Iran could be an effective counter to the global threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and bears a high potential of contributing to stability in West Asia and maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. The international community needs to realize the potential of ISIS to disrupt the West Asian international shipping lanes (ISL) by targeting oil and gas tankers, particularly in the maritime choke-points. The Iranian Navy may be a bulwark against the ISIS in securing the global energy trade sourced from the Persian/ Arabian Gulf. The positive trends in P+1 negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme represents an opportunity for the stakeholders to engage with Iran.

The other relevant powers that could potentially contribute to CPGS in the region are South Africa, Pakistan and a cohesive group of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Their highly capable and professional maritime forces could contribute significantly to regional CPGS effort. However, the political leaderships in Islamabad and the GCC capitals need to realize the emerging imperative to look beyond their respective sub-regional rivalries.

Concluding Remarks

The postulated CPGS architecture for the Indo-Pacific region conforms to the so-called "inclusive approach to maritime security," which has been the 'mantra' of all the multilateral security institutions of the region: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting – Plus (ADMM+), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). However, in the longer term, a formulation of regional security and stability architecture on a select group of regional countries and non-resident powers does not auger well for regional and global security.

The CPGS effort would need to be pan-Indo Pacific and collective, and enmesh the IOR and Western Pacific spheres of multilateralism. While it may be too ambitious and unrealistic to expect 'all' regional countries to acquire 'surplus' capacity for CPGS, even if the smaller countries develop adequate capacity to police their respective maritime zones and areas of SAR responsibility, they could contribute significantly to the collective regional CPGS effort. The efforts of multilateral institutions, and major and middle powers would need to be directed towards such 'capacity-building.'

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF, the Indian Navy, or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com

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Notes:

[i] The term 'Indo-Pacific Region' was first used in 2007 by the author. See 'Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation', Strategic Analysis, Vol 31(1), January 2007, pp.139-153.

[ii] Paul A. Samuelson , 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Nov., 1954), pp. 387-389

[iii] The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?' Arms Control Association, June 2004, at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Joseph. Also see, Gurpreet S Khurana, 'Proliferation Security Initiative: An Assessment', Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2004, p.237

[iv] Joshua Ho, 'Operationalising the Regional Maritime Security Initiative', IDSS Commentary (18/2004), 27 May 2004 at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO04018.pdf

[v] Address by the US Navy CNO Admiral Mike Mullen to the students and Faculty of the Naval War College, 31 August 2005 at the Naval War College Newport, R.I. See US Navy website at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=2

[vi] 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower', October 2007, at https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/Maritime_Strategy.pdf

[vii] 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower', US Maritime Strategy, 2015. Also see, Gurpreet S Khurana, 'Indo-Asia Pacific' Explained: An Assessment of US Maritime Strategy 2015', Web-publication of National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, 21 August 2015, at http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/635756366838030982.pdf

[viii] The concept of 'net security' is defined as "…the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability to monitor, contain and counter all of these". 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy', Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, New Delhi.

[ix] 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces', Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, April 2013, Beijing, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm

[x] Rory Medcalf and C Raja Mohan, 'Responding to Indo-Pacific rivalry: Australia, India and middle power coalitions', Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2014, at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/responding_to_indo-pacific_rivalry_0.pdf

[xi] Gurpreet S Khurana, ' AUSINDEX-2015: Australia 'Pivots' to the Indian Ocean', Web-publication of National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, 12 October 15, at http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/635802023056774316.pdf

[xii] In the 1970s, Australia was wary of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, which led to the establishment of its lone naval base in west (HMAS Sterling)in 1978 and enunciation of 'Two Ocean Policy' in 1986, through which Canberra intended to relocate half of the Navy's fleet to the Indian Ocean seaboard.

[xiii] E-mail communication with Commodore Sam Bateman (Retd.), Royal Australian Navy (RAN), 24 October 2015.

[xiv] 'Mr. Modi's Ocean View', The Hindu, 17 March 2015, at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/mr-modis-ocean-view/article7000182.ece

[xv] 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy', Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, New Delhi. For an analysis of the Strategy, see Gurpreet S Khurana, 'Net Security Provider' Defined: An Analysis of India's New Maritime Strategy-2015', Web-publication of National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, 23 November, at http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/635838396645834619.pdf

[xvi] 'Japan to reinforce SDF anti-piracy base in Djibouti for broader Middle East responses', Asahi Shimbun, 19 January 2015, at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201501190036

[xvii] 'European Union Maritime Security Strategy', Council of the European Union, Brussels, 24 June 2014, at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT

[xviii] European Commission Press Release data base, Brussels, 6 March 2014, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-224_en.htm

[xix] In December 2015, Britain began construction of is new military base at Bahrain. 'Work starts on new UK military base in Bahrain', The Gulf News, 18 December 2015, at http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/work-starts-on-new-uk-military-base-in-bahrain-1.1610885

[xx] 'Jokowi's Inaugural Speech as Nation's Seventh President', The Jakarta Globe, 20 October 2014, at http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowis-inaugural-speech-nations-seventh-president/ Also see, Gurpreet S Khurana, 'The Maritime 'Rise' of Indonesia: Indicators, Intentions and Inferences', Web-publication of National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, 16 Jan 2015, at http://www.maritimeindia.org/CommentryView.aspx?NMFCID=5381

Source: Common Public Good at Sea: Evolving Architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region

Fears of terrorist merger from 'poison' in south-east Asia

A merger of terrorist groups pledging allegiance to Islamic State in the Philippines could signal a new threat to the region should radicals from Indonesia also join forces, according to an expert on violent extremism.

A video reportedly showing an Islamic State training camp in the Philippines. Photo: YouTube

Videos posted online claim to show Philippines-based Islamic State militants training. Photo: YouTube

An Islamic State militant holds the group's flag as he stands on a tank they captured from Syrian government forces in the town of Qaryatain, south-west of Palmyra, in August. Photo: via AP

Radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir is seen behind bars before his hearing verdict at the South Jakarta District Court in 2011. Photo: Dimas Ardian

exit

Jakarta/Bangkok: A merger of terrorist groups pledging allegiance to Islamic State in the Philippines could signal a new threat to the region should radicals from Indonesia also join forces, according to an expert on violent extremism.

A new video from the strife-torn southern Philippines island of Mindanao suggests four Islamic terrorist groups in the long-running insurgency have joined to declare allegiance to IS.

The video purports to show militants carrying IS flags and the heavily armed commanders of the groups that had declared their allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop said Australia was "concerned about the growing influence" of Islamic State in the region and increased co-operation between security agencies was under way in response to the threat posed by these and other extremists.

The groups, including the brutal Abu Sayyaf​, have for years justified using violence for extreme Islamist causes, but analysts say they have presented an ideological facade to cover criminal acts, including lucrative kidnappings for ransom.

"This could set a precedent in the region of disparate groups coming together and declaring bayah (pledging allegiance)," said Professor Anne Azza Aly, an expert on violent extremism, from Edith Cowan University.

"I think the level of transnational co-ordination that could come out of that between a group in Indonesia and a group in the Philippines would signal a heightened threat for Indonesia as well as for the region."

The southern Philippines groups are already known to have recruited several notorious Indonesian terrorists, including militants from Jemaah Islamiyah, the group responsible for the Bali bombings and other attacks in south-east Asia over a decade.

In late November Philippine soldiers said they had killed Indonesian Ibrahim Alih, also known as Abdul Fatah, who was linked to the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004.

Former Australian Federal Police expert and counter terrorism specialist Mark Briskey said the Mindanao conflict "poisons the entire region".

"We've seen connections from the region over to Malaysia and certainly to Indonesia. It's been an ongoing sore," Dr Briskey said.

Indonesian police reacted cautiously to the apparent merger in Mindanao and any regional implications.

Indonesian National Police spokesman Agus Rianto said the threat to Indonesia depended on whether extremist groups in the two countries "communicate and make a synergy".

"Many in Indonesia have claimed they supported ISIS but so far, thank God, no big problems have occurred," he said.

He said Indonesia was co-operating with neighbouring countries, including police in the Philippines.

Malaysia radicals believed to be in Philippines

Radicals from Malaysia are also believed to have fled to the Philippines to train and recruit IS fighters, and although the Filipino groups began displaying black flags symbolising support for al-Qaeda as early as 2011, the the latest video suggests they might have agreed to consolidate their forces.

The video was posted on January 4, according to the online news webite Rappler, and showed Abu Sayyaf leader Isnilon Hapilon​ marching with other extremist leaders who operate from bases on nearby islands. The video has since being removed.

Indonesia specialist Greg Fealy, from the Australian National University, said it was unclear whether the central leadership of ISIS in Syria and Iraq was  interested in spawning a formal organisation in south-east Asia.

Associate Professor Fealy said ISIS has been willing to accept recruits from the region as well as any funds raised, but despite its large Muslim population, fighters from south-east Asia only played a peripheral role.

Indonesia was on the highest possible alert for a terror attack over the holiday period, with 11 alleged terrorists – suspected to be planning an attack in December – arrested in the lead-up to Christmas.

21 Indonesia groups state IS support

Adhe Bhakti, a researcher at Centre for Radicalism and De-radicalisation Studies in Jakarta, said there were 21 groups in Indonesia that had stated they supported IS.

But he said these groups were fragmented.

"They are just small local groups like in Central Java or in South Sulawesi. Also, there is no emir or leader to unite them. Most importantly the government is monitoring their movement very closely," he said.

Indonesian terrorism analyst Noor Huda Ismail said links between Indonesia and the Philippines were nothing new.

"There is a network of Indonesians fighting in Mindanao now," he said.

In 2012, an Indonesian counter-terrorism squad killed Farhan, a suspected militant who had returned from the south Philippines in 2010.

Farhan was the stepson of convicted terrorist Abu Omar and attended the school radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir co-founded.

'He did not know what ISIS was'

Meanwhile, Bashir will apply for a judicial review of his 15-year jail sentence in a court in Central Java on Tuesday.

Bashir was acquitted over charges relating to the Bali bombings but convicted in 2011 of supporting a terror training camp in Aceh.

He pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State in 2014 while behind bars in a prison on Nusakambangan, the penal island where Australians Myuran Sukumaran and Andrew Chan were executed last year.

But his lawyer, Achmad Michdan, said Bashir no longer supported IS.

"He did in the past because he did not know what ISIS was. Now after he knows what ISIS is he does not support it anymore. He only supports anyone or any organisation that supports the upholding of the Koran and Hadith."

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The story Fears of terrorist merger from 'poison' in south-east Asia first appeared on The Sydney Morning Herald.

Source: Fears of terrorist merger from 'poison' in south-east Asia

Indonesia catching up on development in face of AEC: President

Jakarta (ANTARA News) - President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) said Indonesia had done its best to catch up on development over the past one year in the face of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).

"We have no words other than hard work in catching up on development and in overcoming shortcomings," President Jokowi said when addressing the opening of the First National Working Meeting of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) for the 2016-2020 period here on Sunday.

He said all member countries shared the same worries on what would happen in the implementation of the AEC.

"They are afraid of being flooded by Indonesian goods. There are fears among us (ASEAN members). They are afraid, why should we also be afraid?. We should be confident, although we have to improve many things. But (actually) we can compete," the President said.

Jokowi said Indonesia had made several efforts to catch up on the development in the face of AEC such as the development of infrastruc ture, namely seaports and airports.

He said in 2016 the government was giving attention to the development of the Indonesian eastern region.

With multiple amount of budget compared to that in the previous year, the government hoped to create balance in the development results across the country, he said.

"We want to have sovereignty, (economic) independence and (cultural) dignity, and for that if I consider something is right, and indeed it is right, I will never have doubts to do it," he said.(*)

Source: Indonesia catching up on development in face of AEC: President

Indonesian rights commission tells Japan to review power project

JAKARTA – An Indonesian state-sanctioned but independent human rights commission has told Japan to carefully review a controversial $4 billion thermal power plant project funded by a joint consortium because human rights violations in the land acquisition process have been uncovered.

"We asked Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and (the Japanese) parliament to seriously review Japan's involvement in this project," Dianto Bachriadi, commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission, said in a recent interview, revealing that official letters were sent to both on Dec. 21.

"We didn't say that we reject the project. We didn't say that we didn't agree with Japan's investment, but (we want to say) please, respect human rights when investing in Indonesia," he said.

The 2,000-megawatt coal-fired power plant, meant to supply electricity to 13 million people in Central Java Province, was promoted by PT Bhimasena Power Indonesia, a consortium involving Japan's Electric Power Development Co. (J-Power), Itochu Corp. and Indonesia's coal mining company Adaro Energy.

Construction of the power plant, one of the biggest of its kind in Southeast Asia, was initially slated to start in 2012, with commercial operations expected to commence by 2016.

But land acquisition for the project has been delayed amid on-again, off-again negotiations with residents dominated by concerns over its environmental impact.

On June 30 last year, the Central Java provincial government issued a decree allowing the state electricity company PLN to seize land from the residents even as villagers owning a total of 12.51 hectares of land were refusing to sell.

The project itself requires 226 hectares of land straddling three sub-districts in Batang Regency in Central Java.

Two months later, President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo kicked off the construction of the project amid objections from some villagers there whose land was forcibly taken by the government to build the plant.

According to Dianto, the letters were sent to Abe and the Diet following a visit by representatives of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation to the commission on Dec. 14 to seek clarification and more information about the commission's perspective on the project.

From the meeting with JBIC, Dianto wrote in the letter to Abe, a copy of which was obtained by Kyodo News, "I have a confirmative information that the Japanese government and the JBIC will assess a plan of the Japanese government's full involvement in this project through JBIC."

In the letter, Dianto, who deals with human rights monitoring and investigation, told Abe that various human rights violations and abuses had taken place during the land acquisition process starting in 2013, "including intimidations and physical and mental threats" to local people whose livelihoods depend on the area where construction is ongoing.

Heavy machines driven by military soldiers hired by the government and the consortium, according to Dianto, made canals surrounding the properties of local people who were refusing to sell.

"It has made them isolated. People from outside can't go in and the residents can't bring their products out," he said.

Dianto said that since the beginning, the commission has suggested the government and consortium prepare an appropriate and transparent "participatory social security plan" to ensure the rights of the residents will be respected, their futures will be better and the impact of the project on their lives will be minimum.

The commission, he added, has also recommended the project site be moved to a less-populated and less-conflicted area.

The recommendation and suggestion, however, fell on deaf ears.

Greenpeace Indonesia said Ujungnegoro and four other villages in Batang Regency — Karanggeneng, Roban, Wonokerso and Ponowareng — will be affected by the project, threatening the livelihoods of more than 15,000 small-scale fishermen, farmers and their families.

The consortium claims the power plant will be built on land that is unproductive from an agricultural point of view.

Greenpeace also said the power plant will also pump 10.8 million tons of carbon into the atmosphere a year, as well as pollutants including neurotoxins such as mercury that will have deadly consequences for the environment and the health of Indonesians.

Supporting the consortium, however, the government says the power station will feature high-generation efficiency using an "ultra-supercritical" coal-processing system that will have a low impact on the environment.

"I do believe that the government of Japan will put justice, prosperity, respect and protection of human rights at the highest place of living standard and in an international cooperation," Dianto told Abe in the letter.

Source: Indonesian rights commission tells Japan to review power project